Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. [14] IBM, Deep Blue, Icons of Progress, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/. As such, Chicken scenarios are unlikely to greatly affect AI coordination strategies but are still important to consider as a possibility nonetheless. Actor As preference order: DC > DD > CC > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > DD > CC > DC. In biology many circumstances that have been described as prisoner's dilemma might also be interpreted as a stag hunt, depending on how fitness is calculated. We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag -hunters . Stag hunt - Wikipedia The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. The coincident timing of high-profile talks with a leaked report that President Trump seeks to reduce troop levels by half has already triggered a political frenzy in Kabul. Depending on the payoff structures, we can anticipate different likelihoods of and preferences for cooperation or defection on the part of the actors. This subsection looks at the four predominant models that describe the situation two international actors might find themselves in when considering cooperation in developing AI, where research and development is costly and its outcome is uncertain. In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. It sends a message to the countrys fractious elites that the rewards for cooperation remain far richer than those that would come from going it alone. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. 0000006229 00000 n In order to mitigate or prevent the deleterious effects of arms races, international relations scholars have also studied the dynamics that surround arms control agreements and the conditions under which actors might coordinate with one another. While they lie in wait, uncertain of their prospects, rabbits hop by, tempting members of the band to defect in favor of smaller but surer prey. The Stag Hunt: A Lesson in Game Theory - Ascenturn Individuals, factions and coalitions previously on the same pro-government side have begun to trade accusations with one another. For instance if a=10, b=5, c=0, and d=2. Landing The Job You Want Through YourNetwork, Earth Day: Using game theory and AI to beat thepoachers, Adopting to Facebooks new Like Alternative. 0000018184 00000 n And, seeing how successful the stag hunters are, most hare hunters will convert to stag hunters. One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. On the face of it, the USSR Swerved, but I believe that both sides actually made concessions, although the US made theirs later on, to save face. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. PDF Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding: Imperfect Information Deadlock occurs when each actors greatest preference would be to defect while their opponent cooperates. Any individual move to capture a rabbit will guarantee a small meal for the defector but ensure the loss of the bigger, shared bounty. Uses of Game Theory in International Relations Under the assumption that actors have a combination of both competing and common interests, those actors may cooperate when those common interests compel such action. She dismisses Clausewitz with the argument that he saw war as "the use of military means to defeat another state" and that this approach to warfare is no longer applicable in today's conflicts. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. At key moments, the cooperation among Afghan politicians has been maintained with a persuasive nudge from U.S. diplomats. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. There are three levels - the man, the structure of the state and the international system. The Use of Force in International Politics: Four Revolutions Gray[36] defines an arms race as two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attain to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties.. Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. 0000004367 00000 n Stag hunt definition and meaning | Collins English Dictionary Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. > The heated debate about the possibility of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, prompted by recent negotiations between the U.S. government and the Taliban, has focused understandably on the military value of security assistance. Here, values are measured in utility. Under which four circumstances does the new norm of the 'Responsibility to Protect' arise? Here, values are measured in utility. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. If a hunter leaps out and kills the hare, he will eat, but the trap laid for the stag will be wasted and the other hunters will starve. What is the difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide? These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. We have recently seen an increase in media acknowledgement of the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the negative social implications that can arise from its development. Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. In times of stress, individual unicellular protists will aggregate to form one large body. arguing that territorial conflicts in international relations follow a strategic logic but one defined by the cost-benefit calculations that . However, both hunters know the only way to successfully hunt a stag is with the other's help. HV6am`vjyJ%K>{:kK$C$$EedI3OilJZT$h_'eN. [6], Aumann proposed: "Let us now change the scenario by permitting pre-play communication. Press: 1992). I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. The Stag Hunt 2,589 views Aug 6, 2020 A brief introduction to the stag hunt game in international relations. Finally, Table 13 outlines an example payoff structure that results in a Stag Hunt. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. PDF The Stag Hunt - University of California, Irvine Economic Theory of Networks at Temple University, Economic theory of networks course discussion. In testing the game's effectiveness, I found that students who played the game scored higher on the exam than students who did not play. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Like the hunters in the woods, Afghanistans political elites have a great deal, at least theoretically, to gain from sticking together. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Chicken game. This is expressed in the following way: The intuition behind this is laid out in Armstrong et al.s Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence.[55] The authors suggest each actor would be incentivized to skimp on safety precautions in order to attain the transformative and powerful benefits of AI before an opponent. Most prominently addressed in Nick Bostroms Superintelligence, the creation of an artificial superintelligence (ASI)[24] requires exceptional care and safety measures to avoid developing an ASI whose misaligned values and capacity can result in existential risks for mankind. Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. [55] See also Bostrom, Superintelligence at Chapter 14. As a result, it is important to consider deadlock as a potential model that might explain the landscape of AI coordination. In each of these models, the payoffs can be most simply described as the anticipated benefit from developing AI minus the anticipated harm from developing AI. Here, this is expressed as P_(h|A or B) (A)h_(A or B). Additionally, Koubi[42] develops a model of military technological races that suggests the level of spending on research and development varies with changes in an actors relative position in a race. 1. 0000000696 00000 n In their paper, the authors suggest Both the game that underlies an arms race and the conditions under which it is conducted can dramatically affect the success of any strategy designed to end it[58]. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production. Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. If the regime allows for multilateral development, for example, the actors might agree that whoever reaches AI first receives 60% of the benefit, while the other actor receives 40% of the benefit. In this paper, I develop a simple theory to explain whether two international actors are likely to cooperate or compete in developing AI and analyze what variables factor into this assessment. But what is even more interesting (even despairing) is, when the situation is more localized and with a smaller network of acquainted people, most players still choose to hunt the hare as opposed to working together to hunt the stag. [11] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier, June 2017, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Advanced%20Electronics/Our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx: 5 (estimating major tech companies in 2016 spent $20-30 billion on AI development and acquisitions). Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. [52] Stefan Persson, Deadlocks in International Negotiation, Cooperation and Conflict 29, 3(1994): 211244. In order to assess the likelihood of such a Coordination Regimes success, one would have to take into account the two actors expected payoffs from cooperating or defecting from the regime. If both choose to leave the hedge it will grow tall and bushy but neither will be wasting money on the services of a gardener. Instead, each hunter should separately choose the more ambitious and far more rewarding goal of getting the stag, thereby giving up some autonomy in exchange for the other hunter's cooperation and added might. In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. PRICE CODE 17. %%EOF The story is briey told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: "If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach Especially as prospects of coordinating are continuous, this can be a promising strategy to pursue with the support of further landscape research to more accurately assess payoff variables and what might cause them to change. If security increases cant be distinguished as purely defensive, this decreases instability. Finally, the paper will consider some of the practical limitations of the theory. One example payoff structure that results in a Prisoners Dilemma is outlined in Table 7. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. A persons choice to bind himself to a social contract depends entirely on his beliefs whether or not the other persons or peoples choice. 714 0 obj [2] Tom Simonite, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race, Wired., September 8, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/. [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). Table 9. Read the following questions. Outline a basic understanding of what the discipline of International Relations is about, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778): Parable of the Stag Hunt. Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. Using their intuition, the remainder of this paper looks at strategy and policy considerations relevant to some game models in the context of the AI Coordination Problem. Prisoner's Dilemma - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 0000003638 00000 n While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. December 5, 2010 at 2:49 pm. [16] Google DeepMind, DeepMind and Blizzard open StarCraft II as an AI research environment, https://deepmind.com/blog/deepmind-and-blizzard-open-starcraft-ii-ai-research-environment/. On a separate piece of paper, write the best possible answer for each one. Your application of the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game to international trade agreements raises a few very interesting and important questions for the application of game theory to real-life strategic situations. Payoff variables for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. Back to the lionesses in Etosha National Park . A person's choice to bind himself to a social contract depends entirely on his beliefs whether or not the other person's or people's choice. This makes the risk twofold; the risk that the stag does not appear, and the risk that another hunter takes the kill. Robert J Aumann, "Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing," in Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation (Essays in Honor of Jacques Dreze), edited by J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. Some observers argue that a precipitous American retreat will leave the countryand even the capital, Kabulvulnerable to an emboldened, undeterred Taliban given the limited capabilities of Afghanistans national security forces. Formally, a stag hunt is a game with two pure strategy Nash equilibriaone that is risk dominant and another that is payoff dominant. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified . It would be much better for each hunter, acting individually, to give up total autonomy and minimal risk, which brings only the small reward of the hare. Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources The article states that the only difference between the two scenarios is that the localized group decided to hunt hares more quickly. NUMBER OF PAGES 65 14. }}F:,EdSr A hurried U.S. exit will incentivize Afghanistans various competing factions more than ever before to defect in favor of short-term gains on the assumption that one of the lead hunters in the band has given up the fight. Other names for it or its variants include "assurance game", "coordination game", and "trust dilemma". This could be achieved through signaling lack of effort to increase an actors military capacity (perhaps by domestic bans on AI weapon development, for example). Here, both actors demonstrate high uncertainty about whether they will develop a beneficial or harmful AI alone (both Actors see the likelihood as a 50/50 split), but they perceive the potential benefits of AI to be slightly greater than the potential harms. Under this principle, parties to an armed conflict must always distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military targets on the other. . [27] An academic survey conducted showed that AI experts and researchers believe there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years. I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. A classic game theoretic allegory best demonstrates the various incentives at stake for the United States and Afghan political elites at this moment. Absolute gains will engage in comparative advantage and expand the overall economy while relative . GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS - University of South Carolina The Stag-hunt is probably more useful since games in life have many equilibria, and its a question of how you can get to the good ones. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). Example of stag hunt in international relations - United States guide [21] Moreover, racist algorithms[22] and lethal autonomous weapons systems[23] force us to grapple with difficult ethical questions as we apply AI to more society realms. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. [31] Meanwhile, U.S. military and intelligence agencies like the NSA and DARPA continue to fund public AI research. Additionally, the defector can expect to receive the additional expected benefit of defecting and covertly pursuing AI development outside of the Coordination Regime. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. However, anyone who hunts rabbit can do sosuccessfullyby themselves, but with a smaller meal. \wb94W(F}pYY"[17/x(K+jf+M)S_3ZP7~Nj\TgTId=/o7Mx{a[ K} They will be tempted to use the prospect of negotiations with the Taliban and the upcoming election season to score quick points at their rivals expense, foregoing the kinds of political cooperation that have held the country together until now. Nash Equilibrium Examples [56] look at three different types of strategies governments can take to reduce the level of arms competition with a rival: (1) a unilateral strategy where an actors individual actions impact race dynamics (for example, by focusing on shifting to defensive weapons[57]), (2) a tacit bargaining strategy that ties defensive expenditures to those of a rival, and (3) a negotiation strategy composed of formal arms talks. Last Resort, Legitimate authority, Just cause, high probablity of succession, right intention, proportionality, casualities. They suggest that new weapons (or systems) that derive from radical technological breakthroughs can render a first strike more attractive, whereas basic arms buildups provide deterrence against a first strike. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. The payoff matrix would need adjusting if players who defect against cooperators might be punished for their defection. In this section, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. <<3B74F05AAAB3B2110A0010B6ACF6FC7F>]/Prev 397494>> In the most common account of this dilemma, which is quite different from Rousseau's, two hunters must decide separately, and without the other knowing, whether to hunt a stag or a hare. The game is a prototype of the social contract. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. In order for human security to challenge global inequalities, there has to be cooperation between a country's foreign policy and its approach to global health. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a new game of revenge. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 10. As a result, this tradeoff between costs and benefits has the potential to hinder prospects for cooperation under an AI Coordination Regime.